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HOME: NO PLACE FOR "LAW
ENFORCEMENT THEATRICALS"--THE
OUTLAWING OF POLICE/MEDIA HOME
INVASIONS IN AYENI V. MOTTOLA
Elsa Y Ransom*
I. INTRODUCTION
A few television seasons ago, one of the local newscasts in Houston
regularly featured a police officer patrolling the city on camera to find and
arrest criminal suspects, often in their homes. The officer was noted for his
"goofball approach" to what he described as "fishing for felons" and
"cruising for crooks" to get them "cuffed and stuffed" or "nailed and
jailed."' Scenes of law enforcement officers entering the homes of
suspects have long been a fixture in television news. In recent years,. with
the advent of reality-based police shows, such scenes have become more
revealing as the camera began to follow the police inside to give the viewer
a close-up look at the search and arrest. At the 1995 meeting of the
National Association of Television Program Executives, fifteen new reality-
based entertainment programs were unveiled, including at least three that
were exclusively devoted to fighting crime.2 All indications are that the
public has a voracious appetite for such programming---an appetite
producers are eager to satisfy
But a recent interlocutory appeal ruling by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit may give pause to those interested in
producing such programs either for the purpose of news or entertainment.
* Associate Professor, School of Law, Texas Southern University; J.D., University of Texas,
1987; M.S., Syracuse University, 1970; B.S., Indiana University, 1969. The author is a former
television news producer and reporter (1970-78). She wishes to thank Todd Vaughn, Mark
Herrera, Richard Olivo and Derrick Reese for their research assistance.
1. Carol Rust, Cruising for Crooks: Cops Nail Big Time With Capers, Hous. CHRON., July
23, 1993, at 6.
2. David Tobenkin, Stations Face New Reality: Syndicators Have Host of Offerings,
Including Magazine, Health, Law Enforcement Entries, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 23, 1995,
at 58.
3. Id.
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In Ayeni v. Mottola,4 the court denied a Secret Service agent qualified
immunity from suit in a civil rights action brought by a homeowner who
had been subjected to a surprise government search conducted before a
Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") video camera. The case marks the
first time a federal appeals court has addressed the legal issues arising
specifically from the joint enterprise of law enforcement and media to
produce news or reality-based entertainment programs, in what has come
to be known as "tag-along" or "sidekick" journalism. 5 Indeed, the case
marks the first time such issues have been appealed all the way to the
United States Supreme Court. The Court denied review last April.
6
As an interlocutory appeal ruling, the Second Circuit's opinion
addresses only the qualified immunity issue. To date, the case has not been
tried on the merits. Nevertheless, the opinion sends a clear message to
police/reporter teams that it is time to exercise greater restraint in the
practice of surprising unwitting television "performers" in their homes.
This Article explores the implications of the Ayeni case for both law
enforcement and media organizations. Part II traces recent court develop-
ments surrounding the Ayeni case. Part III examines Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to invitations by law enforcement officers to
media representatives to accompany the officers onto private property to
videotape searches and seizures. Part IV examines the affirmative defense
of qualified immunity for government officials, particularly as applied
against Fourth Amendment claims involving the presence of third parties
during searches. Part V explores the apparent ramifications of the Ayeni
ruling for law enforcement and media entities. Part VI examines the tort
liability of media engaged in sidekick journalism. Part VII argues that the
joint incursions of law enforcement and media representatives inside private
homes for purposes of producing news or reality-based entertainment
programs poses a variety of threats to individual rights and interests. Part
VIII concludes with the observation that there are profound legal risks for
both the media and law enforcement participants in these joint invasions,
and that the practice diminishes the value of both of these institutions to
society.
4. 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
5. See Peter Viles, Privacy-A Murky Area in First Amendment Law, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Jan. 17, 1994, at 70 (referring to police/media collaborative reports as "tag-along-with-the-
police" stories); Kent R. Middleton, Journalists, Trespass, and Officials: Closing the Door on
Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 259, 260 (1989) (referring to the cooperative
practices of police and media as "sidekick journalism").
6. Mottola v. Ayeni, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL COURTS
CONCERNING POLICE/MEDIA HOME INVASIONS
A. United States v. Sanusi7
One evening in March 1992, United States Secret Service agents,
accompanied by a CBS news camera crew and producer, entered a
Brooklyn, New York, apartment to execute a search warrant for potential
evidence of credit card fraud. A woman, clad in a dressing gown, and her
five year old son were visibly shaken by the surprise visit.' According to
her account, the facts of which remain untried as of this writing, the agents
pushed her, told her to "shut up," failed initially to produce the warrant
despite her repeated requests that they do so, rummaged through personal
belongings, and broke furniture.9
The CBS camera crew, on assignment for the news program "Street
Stories," captured scenes of the woman and her child on videotape over her
repeated objections.'0 The tape contained shots of her cowering, shielding
her face with a magazine, directing her child not to look at the camera, and
undergoing interrogation on such matters as the whereabouts of her
husband, Babatunde Ayeni, "the guy we're looking for," and the source of
payment for several watches found at the scene." The tape also contained
closeup shots of family photographs and other personal belongings
uncovered by the officers during their search.' 2 The agent apparently in
charge of the operation, equipped with a wireless microphone, gave running
commentary and responses to interview questions from the CBS producer
including a detailed explanation of "the modus operandi of people who
commit credit card fraud and the tools of the trade."' 3  As a federal
district judge noted later, "[t]he imputation of [Mr. Ayeni's] guilt [was]
unmistakable."' 4 In the closing scenes of the videotape, the lead agent
expressed "disappointment that the apartment 'looks clean"' but continued
to suspect that Ayeni was involved in a credit card fraud conspiracy.
5
7. 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
8. See id. at 152.
9. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1994).
10. United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 152.
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The government subsequently brought criminal conspiracy charges
against Ayeni and nine other suspects.' 6  Ayeni subpoenaed CBS for
production of the videotape to use in his defense. CBS resisted by filing
a motion to quash the subpoena on First Amendment grounds. Federal
District Judge Jack Weinstein ordered the network to turn over the tape to
Ayeni with the stipulation that CBS could first block out the identity of its
source. 7 Judge Weinstein reasoned that the videotape was valuable to
Ayeni's case and that Ayeni's constitutional right to a fair trial outweighed
the qualified privilege to gather news afforded CBS under the First
Amendment. '
8
The memorandum opinion focused, at length, on the importance of the
Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
by government officials and on the sanctity of the home as the "seat of
family life."' 9 While acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment did not
control the conduct of a private actor such as CBS, 20 Judge Weinstein
posited that the network team may have entered the Ayeni apartment under
color of official right.2' In statements highly critical of the actions of both
the agents and the CBS crew, Judge Weinstein assessed the extent of
CBS's privilege in light of its conduct:
That CBS both trespassed upon defendant's home and engaged
in conduct, with the connivance of the government, directly
contrary to Fourth Amendment principles ... bears upon the
court's evaluation of CBS's newsgathering privilege. The First
Amendment is a shield, not a sword. Even a reporter must
accept limits on how far upon another person's privacy he or
she may intrude. To both approve CBS's violation of defen-
dant's privacy and rule that he is not permitted to see the private
16. Id. at 151.
17. Id. at 161.
18. Id. at 159-60.
19. Id. at 158.
20. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 156.
2 1. Id. at 160. In essence, Judge Weinstein suggested that CBS might be liable under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In that
case, the United States Supreme Court created a cause of action for damages against federal
officers who, under color of their authority, violate an individual's constitutional right. The action
is similar to that available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed under
color of state law. The Supreme Court has never extended Bivens liability to parties not
employed by the federal government but at least three federal circuit courts have done so. See
Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard and Howard Attorneys, P.C., 1996 WL 60802 (6th Cir.);
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); Reuber v. United
States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Kauffman v. Anglo-American School of Sofia,
28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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images that were taken from him in the course of that violation
would be intolerable. 2
B. Ayeni v. Mottola
23
Mrs. Ayeni and her son subsequently brought a civil rights action
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 4 against CBS, its "Streets Stories" producer, and the
government agents, alleging that they violated the plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures.25 The defendants filed motions to dismiss the action based on
qualified governmental immunity, but United States District Judge
Weinstein, whom the defendants had encountered previously in United
States v. Sanusi,26 denied the defendants' motions.27  Judge Weinstein
ruled that as private parties rather than government officials, CBS and the
"Street Stories" producer were not entitled to immunity.28  The agents
were not immune from suit because the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that
they violated a clearly established constitutional right at the time of their
actions. 29 Thus, the plaintiffs met the standard for precluding a grant of
immunity to a government official.3"
Judge Weinstein again underscored the importance of Fourth
Amendment principles, citing Katz v. United States,3 on the right to
protection against unreasonable intrusions by government officials into
areas where private citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
3 2
The Ayeni home search, said Weinstein, "[was] the equivalent of a rogue
policeman using his official position to break into a home in order to steal
objects for his own profit or that of another."33 As for CBS, the judge
said:
[it] had no greater right than that of a thief to be in the home,
to 'capture' the scene of the search on film and to remove the
22. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 160.
23. 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
24. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
25. Aycni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
26. 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
27. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 366.
28. Id. at 368.
29. Id. at 367-68.
30. Id. at 368.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. Id. at 353.
33. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 368.
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photographic record. The images, though created by the camera,
are a part of the household; they could not be removed without
permission or official right. . . . The television tape was a
seizure of private property, information, for non-governmental
purposes.34
CBS reached a confidential settlement with the plaintiffs. 3 Lead
agent James Mottola, however, pursued an interlocutory appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from Judge
Weinstein's order denying Mottola's motion to dismiss the suit on qualified
immunity grounds.36 The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Weinstein's
order,37 recapitulating the Fourth Amendment sanctity-of-home theme,38
and expanding the qualified immunity analysis of the earlier opinions. 9
The court held that (1) the Fourth Amendment prohibited Mottola from
bringing the CBS team into the Ayenis' home; (2) the plaintiffs had a
Fourth Amendment right, clearly established at the time of the search, to
be protected from Mottola's actions in doing so; and (3) Mottola could not
have believed, based on a standard of objective reasonableness, that his
conduct was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 40 "A private home,"
wrote Chief Judge Newman, "is not a sound stage for law enforcement
theatricals."'', Agent Mottola's final attempt to gain governmental
immunity failed recently when the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.42
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particular-
34. Id.
35. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 684 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994).
36. Id. at 684.
37. Id. at 686.
38. Id. at 685. "The home has properly been regarded as among the most highly protected
zones of privacy. . . 'ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection."' Id.
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
39. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 685-86.
40. Id. at 686.
41. Id.
42. Mottola v. Ayeni, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
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ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.43
A. History and Objective
The objective of the Fourth Amendment is to restrain government
incursions into the private lives of individual citizens." The underlying
principle is generally traced back to Entick v. Carrington & Three Other
King ' Messengers,45 a 1765 English trespass action involving an invasion
of a home. The search was authorized under general warrant originating
with the Star Chamber, to search and seize items that might be used to
convict the plaintiff of seditious libel. Lord Camden excoriated the
exercise of general warrant authority to invade the plaintiff's dwelling-
house, break open his desks and boxes, and look through his papers:
"Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such a power? We can
safely say, there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what
they have done; if there was it would destroy all the comforts of
society., 46  William Pitt, later known as Lord Chatham, had already
expressed similar sentiments in a 1763 address before the House of
Commons, widely quoted by courts and commentators:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.47
Such sentiments were also voiced against the abusive practices of the
Crown in the American colonies involving the writs of assistance.48 The
colonists were outraged by the unbridled discretion these writs afforded
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
45. 19 State Tr. 1029 (1765).
46. Id.
47. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610 n.2 (8th ed. 1927); see also
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307
(1958); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
48. See NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 583-84 n.21, 608 (1980); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
1996]
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revenue officers to search homes and individuals for smuggled goods.49
These matters could not have gone unnoticed by the Framers of the United
States Constitution.50 Whether for purposes of thwarting the potential for
threats to political and religious freedom like those posed by the general
warrants, or to prevent incursions in the name of trade regulation
enforcement like those authorized under the writs of assistance, the decision
to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights appears to have
been inevitable in light of the historical context.5'
B. The Sanctity of Home
As one commentator has noted, "[n]o study of the scope of [F]ourth
[A]mendment coverage would be complete without acknowledging that the
principle of home sanctity resides securely at the core of the guarantee and
motivates its restraints upon official search and seizure .... Professor
Tomkovicz notes that "[t]he sanctity of the home remains today probably
the most unassailable fact of [F]ourth [A]mendment jurisprudence."53
"The home," he says, "not only provides a domain in which to enjoy
solitude and secrecy, it also furnishes a readily identifiable space within
which people can fearlessly enjoy other entitlements of our free society.
49. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the court observed that:
[T]he writs of assistance.., noted only the object of the search-any uncustomed
goods-and thus left customs officials completely free to search any place where
they believed such goods might be .... The central objectionable feature of [the
writs] was that they provided no judicial check on the determination of the
executing officials that the evidence available justified an intrusion into any
particular home.
Id. at 220.
50. "[W]hat the Framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed... were general
searches--that is, searches by general warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad statute, or by any
other similar authority." Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing W. CUDDIGY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 1402, 1499, 1555 (1990) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School);
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of
Searches and Seizures, 25 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 483, 528 (1994); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure
for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1994); L.
Levy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 221-46 (1988)). See also Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980).
51. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cuddihy, supra note 50,
at 1499, 1554-60).
52. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision
of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 674 n.120 (1985) (citing
COOLEY, supra note 47, at 610 n.2); JACOB LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 25 (1966); LASSON, supra note 48, at 13, 49-50.
53. Tomkovicz, supra note 52, at 674 n.120.
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Homes... furnish opportunities for free expression, free religious practice,
and 'personal autonomy. '
Reverence for the sacredness of the home is equally recognized by the
judiciary.55 In Boyd v. United States,56 the Supreme Court's landmark
Fourth Amendment decision, Justice Bradley wrote eloquently of the need
to safeguard against "all invasions on the part of the government and its
employ[ees] of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."57
Supreme Court Justice Harlan once wrote that "[t]he home derives its
preeminence as the seat of family life."5"
C. Search, Seizure, and Reasonableness
According to Supreme Court Justice Stevens, "[a] 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed." 59 There are two types of seizures. A seizure of
property occurs "when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property." 60 A seizure of a person
takes place when there is "meaningful interference, however brief, with an
individual's freedom of movement.",6' The individual must reasonably
believe that under the "totality of all the circumstances," he or she is not
free to leave,62 or not "free to decline the officers' request or otherwise
terminate the encounter.
63
In Ayeni v. Mottola, the Second Circuit found that the reasonableness
requirement of search and seizure raised two issues: (1) whether the search
or seizure would be reasonable if conducted at all; and (2) whether the
manner and scope of the search or seizure is reasonable. 64 With respect
to the first issue, all searches and seizures presumptively require a warrant
54. Id. at 674.
55. See. e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287
(1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
57. Id. at 630.
58. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 113 n.5.
62. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Compare Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 501 (1983) with INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-19 (1984).
63. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
64. 35 F.3d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985)).
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in order to be reasonable.65 In the absence of a warrant, a search by a law
enforcement officer must be supported by probable cause in order to satisfy
the reasonableness standard.66  Reasonableness as to manner and scope
may require, among other things, that the officer knock and announce,67
not destroy property,6 confine the search to areas that could reasonably
contain the items specified in the warrant,69 and not remain on the
premises for an unreasonable length of time after the search is complete.70
Failure to adhere to the reasonableness standard will, as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, result in the suppression of any evidence dis-
covered.7
D. Third-Party Presence During
Search and Seizure
The central Fourth Amendment issue arising out of the joint
incursions of police and reporters inside private homes during searches and
seizures, is whether the presence of the media at the scene, invited by law
enforcement officers, renders the search or seizure unreasonable. The more
fundamental question involved is whether the presence of any non-
government third party, invited by officers, renders the search or seizure
unreasonable.
65. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967).
66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
67. Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995). The court held that the common law
"knock and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
Id. at 1916. It allowed, however, that under certain circumstances, an unannounced entry may
be reasonable. Id. at 1919.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 446 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
862 (1991); Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). But see California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (holding that police need not obtain a warrant to open a container in
a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire vehicle so long
as they have probable cause to believe the container holds contrband or evidence); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that a warrantless search of the passenger compartment
of a vehicle, as well as containers in it, is permissible when conducted contemporaneously with
a custodial arrest).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Corado, 803 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). See
also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(d) (2d ed. 1987).
71. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914).
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1. Section 3105
Congress has spoken in 18 U.S.C. § 3105 regarding third-party
presence during searches:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the
officers mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by
law to serve such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid
of the officer on his [or her] requiring it, he [or she] being
present and acting in its execution.72
Section 3105 is not controlling authority on the issue of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. Several courts have looked to it for guidance,
however, in determining the boundaries of constitutional "reasonableness"
as applied to searches where non-government third parties were present.
In United States v. Clouston," for example, the presence of telephone
company employees on the premises to aid officers in a search did not, in
light of the statute, render the search unreasonable. In United States v.
Gambino,7" a similar result was reached in line with the statute, in a case
involving the presence of a confidential informant who assisted officers,
and the presence of a computer expert to assist in a search did not violate
section 3105 in United States v. Schwimmer."
If the scope of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment were to
be determined unequivocally by section 3105, then most joint incursions by
police and media into private homes would render the searches un-
reasonable and, therefore, in violation of the amendment since rarely would
a camera crew accompany law enforcement officers on such a mission for
the purpose of assisting them, rather than for the purpose of covering the
event. The Second Circuit relied substantially on section 3105 for guidance
to conclude that the search of the Ayenis' apartment was constitutionally
unreasonable, noting that the defendant never contended that CBS assisted
the officers; rather, it was the officers who were assisting CBS in producing
a television show.
76
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1995). While the statute specifies those who may "serve" a search
warrant, it has been construed to determine those who may "execute" a warrant. See also United
States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486
(6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973).
73. 623 F.2d 485, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1980).
74. 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
75. 692 F. Supp. 119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
76. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1994).
19963
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2. Manner and Scope
Section 3105 is not the only basis for the Second Circuit's conclusion
that the Ayeni home search was unreasonable. The court also considered
the manner and scope of the search.77 According to the court, the Fourth
Amendment required the agents "to preserve the right of privacy to the
maximum extent consistent with reasonable exercise of law enforcement
duties. 78 It required them to limit their actions to the express terms of
the warrant or, under implied authority, to reasonable law enforcement
actions related to the execution of the warrant.79 In examining the
warrant, the court found that it authorized no one other than federal officers
to enter the Ayeni home.8" Agent Mottola neither requested the presence
of a television camera crew, nor indicated any need for one in his warrant
application. 8' Furthermore, Mottola made no implied authority claim that
the CBS crew served any legitimate law enforcement purpose inside the
Ayenis' home.8" The court reasoned, therefore, that the manner in which
Mottola conducted the search was unnecessarily intrusive because it did not
preserve the Ayenis' privacy to the maximum extent possible under the
circumstances. The scope of the search overshot the terms of the warrant
and could not be justified on implied authority grounds since CBS served
no law enforcement function at the scene. As Chief Justice Newman
concluded:
[Mottola's conduct] was calculated to inflict injury on the very
value that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect--the right of
privacy. The purpose of bringing the CBS camera crew into the
Ayenis' home was to permit public broadcast of their private
premises and thus to magnify needlessly the impairment of their
right of privacy.83
77. The Second Circuit's consideration of the manner and scope of the search as factors in
determining reasonableness is in accord with the Supreme Court opinions holding that the manner
in which searches and seizures are conducted affects reasonableness. See Wilson v. Arkansas,
115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (searches); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (seizures).
78. Id. at 686.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
83. Id.
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3. Bills v. Aseltine
In recent months, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rendered a decision in a case pertinent to this discussion because it
involves a police search of a home during which a third party was present
for purposes not authorized under the search warrant. In Bills v. Asel-
tine,84 a police sergeant, acting on an informant's tip, invited a private
security guard at General Motors Corporation ("GM") to accompany him
when, with other officers, he searched a private residence for stolen
property. According to the tip, the residence contained items stolen from
GM. The sergeant knew that GM had been investigating the homeowner
but did not seek a search warrant for the GM property because he did not
believe he had sufficient probable cause. The warrant issued was specific
as to which participants and what conduct it authorized: law enforcement
officers were permitted to search the home, garage and adjoining shed and
to seize a generator. Those restrictions notwithstanding, the security guard
arrived armed with a camera, and took more than two hundred photographs
of GM parts and equipment as he accompanied the officers through the
premises. The next day, the guard obtained a search warrant for the GM
property. The homeowner brought a civil rights action against all police
officers involved, claiming her Fourth Amendment rights, as well as other
constitutional rights, had been violated. 5
The case was before the Sixth Circuit on two separate occasions. In
Bills 1,86 the court reversed a summary judgment for the defendants, which
was based on qualified immunity, "because genuine issues of material fact
exist concerning the reasonableness of the conduct of the police in inviting
a private citizen into the dwelling of another for purposes unrelated to the
execution of the search warrant."87 On remand, the federal district court
ruled that, as a matter of law, the attending officers, as mere subordinates
of the sergeant, met the test for qualified immunity since there was no
evidence that they knew of the guard's purpose for being in the Bills'
home. 88 As for the sergeant, however, the court submitted to a jury the
issue of whether he had "unreasonably exceeded the scope of the warrant"
by inviting "a private person to tour plaintiff's home with a camera for
84. 52 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1995).
85. See Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter "Bills "].
86. Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
87. Id. at 709.
88. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "Bills I'].
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purposes utterly unconnected with the search warrant."89  The jury
returned a verdict for the sergeant. 90 The plaintiff unsuccessfully moved
for a directed verdict at the end of the trial.9
In Bills II, the plaintiff appealed the grant of qualified immunity to the
attending officers and the denial of her motion for a directed verdict.92
With respect to the immunity question, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from raising the issue of the
reasonableness of the attending officers' conduct by the jury's finding that
the sergeant in charge of the operation acted reasonably.93 As for the
second question, the court reasoned that a directed verdict against the police
was not warranted by the mere contention that the security guard's conduct
may have been unlawful. 94 "[W]hile perhaps constituting a trespass, [the
guard's conduct did] not offend the Fourth Amendment."95
Taking Bills and Ayeni together, one must ask why law enforcement
officers executing a search warrant do not violate the Fourth Amendment
when they invite an unauthorized third party to come along and photograph
property not specified in the warrant for purposes of a separate and private
investigation, but do violate the Fourth Amendment when they invite an
unauthorized third party to videotape a network news program segment.
Several factors may have contributed to this discrepancy. First, courts are
split on the role of the judge and jury in resolving the immunity issue. In
Hunter v. Bryant,96 the Supreme Court declared that "immunity ordinarily
should be decided by the court., 97 Accordingly, it is widely held that
courts should not instruct juries to determine the issue of immunity.9" But
sometimes courts determine that certain factual issues must be resolved
before they can decide the question of law.99 In such cases, courts may
ask juries to render a special verdict, consisting of a list of interrogatories
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 604.
93. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1995) [Bills 1].
94. Id. at 605-06.
95. Id. at 606 (citing Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 704) (6th Cir. 1992) [Bills 1].
96. 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
97. Id. at 228.
98. See Kathryn R. Urbonia, Qualified Immunity from Damages, SECTION 1983 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 1994, at 8-37 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H4-5201, 1994). See, e.g., Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11 th
Cir. 1992).
99. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1992); Warren v. Dwyer,
906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990). See Urbonia, supra note 98,
at 8-36.
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that call for findings of fact.'0° The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
also permit the jury to answer special interrogatories before reaching a
general verdict, thus answering factual issues and then applying the facts
to the law.''
In Bills II, the trial court submitted special interrogatories to the jury
on the question of whether the lead police sergeant acted unreasonably
when he invited and permitted the presence of the security guard at the
scene of the search." 2 The jury decided that the conduct was reasonable
and therefore lawful. 0 3 In Ayeni, by contrast, lawfulness of similar law
enforcement conduct was never cast as a factual issue for a jury to resolve.
The Second Circuit determined that the act of inviting and permitting the
presence of CBS during the Ayeni home search was unlawful and should
have been recognized as such by Mottola based on the objective
reasonableness standard used in qualified immunity cases."
Furthermore, in Bills, a question on the defendant's good faith'0 5
was submitted to the jury despite the fact that good faith is no longer a
recognized standard for qualified immunity.10 6 Also, the plaintiff based
her motion for a directed verdict on the argument that the third-party--a
security guard-respassed on her property, a claim the court deemed
neither relevant nor dispositive in her civil rights action against the
defendant.'0 7 All of this yields a troubling result. In a case where there
is virtually no dispute that the presence and conduct of a third party
exceeded the scope of both the search warrant and the exigent circum-
stances that would justify such presence and conduct, the officer respon-
sible is held immune from liability. In consideration of the procedural
factors noted above, however, Bills is clearly distinguishable from Ayeni.
E. Videotaping as Seizure
A seizure of property, as discussed earlier, occurs "when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
100. See Urbonia, supra note 98, at 8-37. See also FED. R. Cv. P. 49(a).
101. FED. R. CIv. P. 49(b).
102. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 1995) [Bills 1).
103. Id. at 600.
104. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
105. Bills II, 52 F.3d at 605.
106. For the current standard for qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
107. Bills II, 52 F.3d at 605-06. The plaintiff further argued that the defendant was required
to present some constitutional justification for the security guard's intrusion. The court found no
legal basis for this contention, however. Id.
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property."'' 0 8  But suppose the property in question is intan-
gible-information, for example. Judge Weinstein observed that taking
photographs is a seizure of information similar to wiretapping 9 but that
photography of areas within "plain view" is constitutional."' The Second
Circuit, relying on Katz v. United States,"' and Silverman v. United
States,"12 found that video and sound recordings constitute seizures within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," 3 but the types of seizures in
Katz and Silverman were more analogous to the situation in which law
enforcement officers operate their own videotaping equipment for purposes
of producing public broadcasts. In its expanded notion of what constitutes
an unreasonable seizure, Ayeni requires a departure from the rule that
Fourth Amendment prohibitions do not apply to private actors."' On the
other hand, where law enforcement officers operate their own videotaping
equipment for purposes of producing public broadcasts, the notion that
videotaping constitutes Fourth Amendment seizure would be more
plausible.
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity applies to government
officials where it is necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public
good or to "ensure that talented candidates not be deterred by the threat of
damages suits from entering public service."'' 5 Under qualified im-
munity, "government officials performing discretionary functions ... are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
108. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U.S. 56 (1992); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).
109. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 367 (citing United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d
1324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990)). See also Berger v. State of New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that the use of electronic devices to capture a conversation is a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 367 (citing Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 1992) [Bills I]; United
States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 166 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 841 (1981)).
111. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
112. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
113. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 688 (2d Cir. 1994).
114. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Private parties serving as federal
actors may be subject to liability for constitutional violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Vector Research, Inc. v.
Howard and Howard Attorneys, P.C., 1996 WL 60802 (6th Cir.); Schowengerdt v. General
Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). But see Kauffman v. Anglo-American School of Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
115. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159 (1992).
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violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.""' 6  Officials can escape civil
liability by showing that they neither knew nor should have known of the
right in question, even when it was clearly established."17 "The contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he or she is doing violates that right.""' 8  The
unlawfulness of the official's actions must be apparent in light of pre-
existing law." 9  The procedural effect of qualified immunity is that it
may render the defendant immune from suit, or operate as a defense to
liability. 20
In order to defeat a claim of qualified immunity, one must show that
"in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the government official's
conduct is apparent. '  The question of how to apply qualified im-
munity remains a source of considerable confusion, however,'22 as
evidenced by the divergent views in the Second and Sixth Circuits on
whether it is a violation of a clearly established right for a law enforcement
officer to invite a private actor/third party to the scene of the execution of
a search warrant. In Ayeni, the Second Circuit answered in the affirmative
after determining that Mottola had failed to meet either of the alternative
requirements for claim dismissal, namely, that the right claimed by the
plaintiff to have been violated was not 'clearly established' as of the time
of the search, or, that it was 'objectively reasonable' for the officer to
believe that his acts did not violate the clearly established right.'23 The
court found that the Ayenis had a clearly established right at the time of the
search to Fourth Amendment protection "from an agent's bringing into their
home persons not expressly nor impliedly authorized to be there ...
Mottola could not with objective reasonableness have believed that his
action was consistent with the Fourth Amendment."' 24  In Bills II, the
Sixth Circuit distinguished Ayeni, criticizing the Second Circuit's
failure to define narrowly the right allegedly violated, instead
describing the violation in abstract and general terms as a Fourth
116. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
117. Id. at 819.
118. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
119. Id.
120. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 518 n.4 (1985).
121. Anderson, 483 U.S. 640.
122. See Urbonia, supra note 98, at 8-36, 8-37.
123. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1994); see Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d
917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993); Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1990).
124. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Amendment right to privacy. . . . It is hard to imagine any
contested search that could not be portrayed as an invasion of
privacy, and even more difficult to see how a police officer
could tailor his [or her] conduct under such a vague stan-
dard.
12 5
The Sixth Circuit cited its own requirement that "the district court must
decide the purely legal question of whether the law at the time of the
alleged action was clearly established in favor of the plaintiff."
' 126
As noted earlier, Bills is distinguishable by its procedural
idiosyncracies.'27 Its conflict with Ayeni underscores the current con-
fusion over the procedural aspects of the qualified immunity defense. In
Hunter v. Bryant, 21 the Supreme Court declared that qualified
"[i]mmunity ordinarily should be decided by the court ... ,,l9 It is
widely held that courts should not instruct juries to determine the issue of
immunity.3 ' But sometimes courts determine that certain factual issues
must be resolved before the question of law can be decided. 3' In such
cases, courts may ask juries to render a special verdict, consisting of a list
of interrogatories that call for findings of fact, 132 or answer special
interrogatories before reaching a general verdict, thus answering factual
issues and then applying the facts to the law.'33
In the past, the Second Circuit has recognized the need for such jury
participation through special interrogatories,' but clearly did not
recognize such a need in Ayeni. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Second Circuit determined, as a matter of law, that Agent Mottola's
conduct was unreasonable and therefore unlawful and that an objectively
reasonable officer would have recognized it as such. 135 In Bills I, on the
other hand, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of
125. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 602 (6th Cir. 1995) [Bills II].
126. Id. at 602 (quoting Dominique v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987)).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
128. 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
129. Id. at 228.
130. See, e.g., Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1578 (1992); Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991). See generally
Urbonia, supra note 98, at 8-37.
131. See Urbonia, supra note 98, at 8-36. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054,
1058 (7th Cir. 1992); Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967
(1990).
132. See supra notes 98 and 131 and accompanying text. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
133. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
134. See Warren, 906 F.2d at 76.
135. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1994).
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qualified immunity "because genuine issues of material fact exist[ed]
concerning the reasonableness of the conduct of the police in inviting a
private citizen into the dwelling of another for purposes unrelated to the
execution of the search warrant."'136  Characterization of the
reasonableness of the officers' conduct as an issue of fact ultimately
necessitated jury participation. The trial court submitted special inter-
rogatories to the jury on the question of whether the supervising police
sergeant conducted himself unreasonably when he invited and permitted the
presence of the security guard at the scene of the search.'37 The jury
decided that the conduct was reasonable and therefore lawful.' As
discussed earlier, the plaintiff's ultimate defeat implicated several adverse
procedural factors. 139
While on the subject of procedure, an explanation is in order as to
how and why the immunity issue in Ayeni was presented to the Second
Circuit as an interlocutory appeal. In Mitchell v. Forsyth,4 ° the Supreme
Court explained that a federal appellate court has jurisdiction under the
"collateral order" doctrine to review an interlocutory appeal of a district
court order that "finally determine[s] claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that the appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."' 14' The
issue of qualified immunity is collateral to the merits of a case; it does not
require a court determination of whether the defendant's conduct is, in fact,
unlawful.' 42  The scope of appellate jurisdiction with respect to the
qualified immunity issue, then, is actually rather narrow, as the Supreme
Court explained:
An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's
claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the
plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the
plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need
determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms
allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at
the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district
136. Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 1992).
137. Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 1995) [Bills IA.
138. Id. at 600.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
140. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
141. Id. at 524-25 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)).
142. Id. at 529 n.10.
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court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the
ground that even under the defendant's version of the facts the
defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the
law clearly proscribed the action the defendant claims he [or
she] took.
14 3
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AYENI DECISION
The effect of the interlocutory appeal in Ayeni v. Mottola'" was to
resolve the issue of the qualified immunity defense against agent Mottola.
As the Supreme Court explained in Mitchell'45 , the issue of qualified
immunity is collateral to the merits of the case; the court does not decide
whether "the defendant's actions were in fact unlawful.' 46 A jury must
now decide whether Mottola played a role in permitting the CBS news
crew to be present at the Ayeni apartment search. 147 In any event, the
Second Circuit decision marks a significant victory for all who oppose
police/media encroachments because it imposes regulations having
constitutional dimensions on an increasingly common practice that has not
often been challenged.
To be sure, some aspects of the court's opinion raise questions, such
as whether videotaping by the media constitutes a "seizure" by the law
enforcement officers who invite the media to accompany them and to what
extent 18 U.S.C. § 3105 should guide the interpretation of reasonableness
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, as the FBI
has concluded, Ayeni sends a clear signal that the practice, for law
enforcement officers, entails considerable legal risk. The Second Circuit
ruling prompted the FBI to issue a warning in its bulletin to law enforce-
ment agencies nationwide that "[m]edia participation in enforcement
activities that occur in private areas should be specifically prohibited, unless
the media obtains [sic] consent from individuals occupying those
areas."1
48
The Ayeni case appears to be equally ominous for media entities.
Since CBS reached a confidential settlement with the plaintiffs prior to the
143. Id. at 528.
144. 35 F.3d 680 (2nd Cir. 1994).
145. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
146. Id. at 529 n.10.
147. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 689 n.l1.
148. Larry Neumeister, Feds Pull Plug On TV Shows Taping Suspects in Police Raids, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 1994, at A18 (quoting FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL.).
A CBS spokesman said the network would stop the practice of sending camera crews into private
homes without the homeowner's permission. Id.
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interlocutory appeal, issues surrounding the liability of media organizations
whose employees follow law enforcement officers into private homes will
not be decided in this case. Still, given the success of plaintiffs in bringing
tort actions against the media in recent years as a result of incursions on
private property, it appears that liability looms large for the media in such
incursions as well as for law enforcement officers.
VI. TORT LAW AND TAG-ALONG MEDIA
A. Trespass
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be
it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon
my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action
though the damage be nothing; which is proved by every
declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to
answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the
soil. 149
These words of Lord Camden appear in the landmark Fourth
Amendment decision by the United States Supreme Court, Boyd v. United
States,5° and illustrate the obvious kinship between trespass and Fourth
Amendment principles. They protect similar interests in property, personal
solitude and individual autonomy from outside encroachment. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts illustrates that, as of the latter half of the twentieth
century, the common law rule of trespass remains as Lord Camden
described it:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespec-
tive of whether he [or she] thereby causes harm to any legally
protected interest of the other, if he [or she] intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a
thing or a third person to do so .... "
During the latter half of the Twentieth Century, in particular, trespass
and intrusion have proven to be formidable weapons against press
incursions into private areas. This development is especially remarkable in
light of the fact that during this same period, press freedoms have otherwise
149. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington & Three
Other King's Messengers, 19 State Tr. 1029 (1765)).
150. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1977).
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expanded considerably with the emergence of constitutional privilege1"2
and with the increasing scrutiny and criticism leveled against privacy
tort. 1
53
B. Intrusion: A Surviving Privacy Tort
The genesis of invasion of privacy as a tort is generally identified in
a Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published 105 years ago.5 4 The authors, prompted by what
they regarded as excesses of the press in "overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency,"'55 proposed a new
cause of action for infringing on one's right "to be let alone."'56 The tort
doctrine developed slowly and rather amorphously over the ensuing years
until 1960 when William Prosser brought some sense of order to the law
by declaring that privacy consisted not of one tort but of four: publicity
which places one in a false light publicly; intrusion upon the seclusion,
solitude, or private affairs of another (hereinafter "intrusion"); public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about another; and appropriation
for one's own advantage of the name and likeness of another.'57 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts subsequently adopted Prosser's scheme.'58
According to the Restatement, "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his [or
her] private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his [or her] privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person."'59 Intrusion claims, unlike other privacy claims,
may arise even in the absence of publication.' 6 Intrusion claims against
152. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
153. See Harvey L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time
Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (1990); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291
(1983); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
154. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
155. Id. at 196.
156. Id. at 205.
157. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L, REV. 383, 389-407 (1960).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977).
159. Id. at § 652B.
160. See Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 718-19 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1212 (1991). In fact, the cause of action for intrusion does not require that the
defendant obtain any information from the plaintiff. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239
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journalists and/or mass media organizations typically target the use of
hidden cameras and microphones or other surveillance devices,'
16
physical trespass, 162 or other invasive conduct that exceeds the scope of
the plaintiff's consent. 1
63
While many such claims are related to trespass,"6 not all intrusions
constitute trespass and vice versa. Recovery under the common law tort of
trespass merely requires an interference with the possessory interests of
another in property without regard to whether the possessor's solitude or
seclusion is affected. 165  Furthermore, under common law trespass, an
unauthorized entry onto property of another need not offend a reasonable
person in order to be actionable. 66 Conversely, tortious intrusions do not
necessarily entail, entry onto private property belonging to another.
67
Trespass law, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, protects
property rights rather than privacy rights.161
Intrusion, on the other hand, protects human dignity and what one
commentator describes as the integrity of one's individual personality.1
69
Such notions, Professor Robert Post observes, are fundamental to much
(N.H. 1964).
161. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
162. See Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
163. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (holding that intrusion was
actionable where plaintiff consented to be interviewed but did not consent to the subsequent use
of her name or photograph). But see Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(holding that a trespass claim is not available when consent is given, albeit induced through fraud,
but that a claim for fraud or intentional misrepresentation may be available).
164. See Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. II1. 1994) for an
overview of the various theories, including trespass and underlying intrusion claims. See also
Zuckman, supra note 153, at 254 ("Intrusion represents little more than the extension of the
ancient torts of trespass to real property and chattels to cover invasions of private spaces such as
homes, offices, and automobiles through the employment of photographic and electronic devises
not requiring apparent physical incursion.").
165. The requirements for recovery under the common law action of trespass did not include
a showing of harm. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13,
at 67 (5th ed. 1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1977).
166. See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 165, § 13, at 67-84.
167. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (illustrating that paparazzi-
style photographing of the plaintiff in public places constituted intrusion); Daily Times Democrat
v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (upholding intrusion claim by a plaintiff who was
photographed in a public place with her dress blown up).
168. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984). Some lower courts have been
steadfast in maintaining the distinction between trespass and intrusion. See also Magenis v.
Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. App. 1990).
169. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989).
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sociological thought. 170  Intrusion, he argues, is a safeguard of "civility
rules," his term for social norms, and of the "chain of ceremony" in social
interactions that results from observance of these rules.'17  By adhering
to a code of conduct, under which individuals observe rules of deference
and demeanor,1 72 they "not only confirm the social order in which they
live, but they also establish and affirm 'ritual and sacred' aspects of their
own and others' identities."173 "Violation of these rules can ... damage
a person by discrediting his identity and injuring his personality. Breaking
the 'chain of ceremony' can deny an individual the capacity to become 'a
complete man' and hence 'disconform' his very 'self."",174  Privacy tort,
intrusion in particular, redresses such injury.
75
In recent years, invasion of privacy torts have come under increasing
scrutiny by courts and commentators. 17 One privacy advocate notes that
although courts in most states claim to recognize privacy torts, there is a
"disturbingly widespread" pattern of summary judgments and dismissals of
privacy claims. 77 The two privacy tort claims that have suffered most
are public disclosure of embarrassing private facts and false light
publicity. 78 A number of factors have contributed to their undoing: (1)
the Supreme Court's severe, if not complete limitation, on state regulation
of the publication of information that is both truthful and lawfully
obtained; 7 1 (2) the newsworthiness exception, often described as the
170. Id. at 968.
171. Id.
172. See Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RiTUAL:
ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47 (1967).
173. Post, supra note 169, at 962 (quoting Goffman, supra note 172, at 91).
174. Id. at 963 (quoting Goffman, supra note 172, at 51).
175. Id.
176. See supra note 157. For a recent discussion of the decline of privacy tort in American
courts, see Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 999 (1995) ("[W]hile courts in
most states purport to recognize the four privacy torts, they do not receive them favorably.
Indeed, a review of court decisions involving privacy claims raises doubts as to whether there
really is a tort remedy for invasion of privacy.").
177. McClurg, supra note 176, at 999.
178. Courts in several states, including Texas, North Carolina, Missouri, Ohio, New York,
and Washington have rejected the common law tort of false light invasion of privacy. See Dupree
v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1988); Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp., 820 F.2d 806
(6th Cir. 1987); Howell v. New York Post, 581 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1992), affd in part, 619 N.E.2d
650 (N.Y. 1993); Renwick v. News and Observer, 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984); Cain v. Hearst,
878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994); Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash.
1986).
179. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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exception that swallows up the private facts tort; 8 ' (3) the common,
although not uniform, practice of applying the stringent actual malice
standard, germane to defamation law, to false light claims;' 8' and (4) the
failure of many false light claims to satisfy the "offensiveness" re-
quirement. 182
One of the reasons why intrusion as a theory of liability succeeds
where other privacy torts appear to be failing, is that intrusion regulates
non-publication conduct. In so doing, it manages to escape the powerful
First Amendment privileges that shield the media from other tort
liabilities.'83 A second reason for its success is that intrusion resembles
trespass, a cornerstone of western jurisprudence. Intrusion, furthermore,
represents the priority that society, confronted by increasingly invasive
technology, affords values of human dignity, integrity, and individual
personality, irrespective of any association they may have with property
interests.' 84 As one commentator noted, "[i]f the intrusive tort did not
already exist, it would have to be invented for a society obsessed with
snooping and facilitating devices capable of capturing and recording the
slightest movements and faintest whispers at considerable distances even
behind solid barriers."'
185
C. Privileges and Defenses
I. Consent
"It is a fundamental principle of the common law that volenti non fit
injuria--to one who is willing, no wrong is done."' 86  Intrusion claims
against news media fail where there is a trespass element of the plaintiff's
180. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). See, e.g., Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 189 (1994).
181. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967). See also Colbert v. World Publishing Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987); Ashby
v. Hustler, 802 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1986); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840
(Ark. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
182. See Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088
(1987) ("In order to avoid a head-on collision with First Amendment rights, courts have narrowly
construed the highly offensive standard.").
183. Zuckman, supra note 153, at 254. See also Jonathan B. Becker, Comment, The First
Amendment Goes Tactical: News Media Negligence and Ongoing Criminal Incidents, 15 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 625 (1995).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. KEETON, ET AL, supra note 165, §18, at 112.
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case that is defeated by the plaintiff's consent.'87 Consent must be freely
given; it may not be obtained through coercion.'88 However, consent
may be express or implied.'89 It is the latter category that is more fertile
for litigation purposes because it requires the interpretation of conduct or
inaction in the absence of overt verbal consent and can impose on the
plaintiff a state of mind to which he or she does not literally subscribe.
a. Implied Consent: The Traditional Doctrine
The existence of implied consent normally rests on the test of
objective manifestation: whether or not a reasonable person would
understand the plaintiff's conduct, inaction, or silence to manifest consent
in the absence of words expressing the plaintiff's acquiescence or
willingness to permit the defendant's conduct. 9 ° Another basis upon
which defendants have been permitted to infer consent is common usage
or custom, as, for example, during times when trespassing on undeveloped
land was generally acceptable in the community. 9' Historically, courts
have permitted unauthorized entry onto private, unfenced lands by such
persons as livestock owners seeking a place to graze their cattle' 92 and
others interested in hunting and fishing.' 93 As one commentator notes,
such cases illustrate that custom and usage have traditionally created
consent when the social purpose of the trespass outweighed the plaintiff's
individual possessory interests in the property.194
b. The Implied Consent Theory of
Sidekick Journalists
On some occasions, news media defendants have attempted to use the
common usage and custom prong of implied consent to escape liability for
187. See Lal v. CBS, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 356, 357-64 (E.D. Pa. 1982), af'd, 726 F.2d 97 (3d
Cir. 1984); Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in relevant part, 801
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987). But see Magenis v. Fisher
Broadcasting Co., 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. 1990) (rejecting the converse notion that a finding of
trespass is sufficient to sustain an intrusion claim).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 58 (1964). See also KEETON, ET AL, supra
note 165, § 18, at 114.
189. KEETON, ET AL, supra note 165, § 18, at 113.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 (1964). See also KEETON ET AL, supra
note 165, at 113.
191. See McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
192. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
193. See, e.g., Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626 (1878).
194. Middleton, supra note 5, at 268.
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trespass in sidekick journalism cases. In Florida during the 1970s, there
were two such attempts of note that yielded opposite results. In Green
Valley School v. Cowles Florida Broadcasting,gs television news
personnel accepted an invitation from the state attorney's office to
accompany law enforcement officers on a midnight raid of a private school
where felonies, including false imprisonment, child abuse, and lewd
behavior, were alleged to have taken place. According to various affidavits
and depositions of teachers and students who resided on the campus, the
officers swarmed through their private living quarters, awakening many of
them and ransacking their personal belongings, while deliberately creating
a scene of disarray for the benefit of rolling cameras. 96 The defendant
broadcaster argued that entry by its employees on the school's property
was, as a matter of law, sanctioned by the state attorney's invitation and
within the privilege of implied consent based on common usage and
custom. 197 Unconvinced, the court ruled that to uphold such an assertion
"could well bring to the citizenry of this state the hobnail boots of a Nazi
stormtrooper equipped with glaring lights invading a couple's bedroom at
midnight with the wife hovering in her nightgown in an attempt to shield
herself from the scanning TV camera."'
198
Within just a few months of the Green Valley School decision,
however, the Florida Supreme Court cast the common usage and custom
theory of implied consent in an entirely different light, one favoring
sidekick journalists. In Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 9 news media
representatives entered a house that had been the scene of a fatal fire after
receiving an invitation and consent, not from the homeowner, but from
police and fire officials. The homeowner, in fact, was out of town at the
time of the blaze and was unaware that it had claimed the life of her
daughter. At the request of one official at the scene, a photographer,
employed by the defendant newspaper, took a picture of the "silhouette"
left on the floor after the removal of the victim's body. The photographer
gave the officials one copy of the picture to use in their investigation of the
incident and submitted the remaining copies to the newspaper for
publication. The homeowner first learned of the facts surrounding the
tragedy when she read the account and saw the photograph published by
the defendant. She sued the newspaper for punitive damages based on
195. 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
196. Id. at 813-16.
197. Id. at 819.
198. Id.
199. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
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trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
theories. °0
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling granting
summary judgment in favor of the newspaper publisher on the trespass
claim.20 ' The state's high court held that the homeowner could not
recover under the trespass theory because the newspaper photographer had
an implied consent, based on common usage, custom, and practice, to enter
her home.20 2 The court noted the numerous affidavits that had been filed
in the case by Florida law enforcement officials and news editors from
across the state and nation supporting the conclusion that "it has been a
longstanding custom and practice throughout the country for representatives
of the news media to enter upon private property where disaster of great
public interest has occurred ....- The only conditions imposed on
news personnel under such circumstances, according to the court, were that
they enter at the invitation of investigating officers, peacefully, without
causing physical damage.204 The fact that the defendant's photographer
went inside a private residence without the owner's permission did not
concern the court: "[I]f an entry is or is not a trespass, its character would
not change depending upon whether or not the place of the tragedy is a
burned out home (as here), an office or other building or place. 20 5
Instead, the court cited the fact that "there was not only no objection to the
entry, but there was an invitation to enter by the officers investigating the
fire.
206
The reception of the Fletcher-style defense has generally been less
than enthusiastic. In 1980, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused to
imply consent as a matter of law to protect a news reporter who entered the
plaintiff's private property without permission and filmed him as he was
being interrogated by Special Weapons and Tactics ("SWAT") team
officers.0 7 In Prahl v. Brosamle, °8 the Wisconsin court distinguished
200. Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
201. Florida Publishing Co., 340 So. 2d at 919. The trial court dismissed the invasion of
privacy claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the publisher on the emotional distress
claim. See Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co. 319 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Only the trespass claim, however, was reversed by the District Court of Appeal. Id. at I I 1-13.
202. Florida Publishing Co., 340 So. 2d at 917-18.
203. Id. at 918 (quoting with approval Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100,
113 (Fla. 1975) (McCord, J., dissenting)).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
208. Id.
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Fletcher since, in the Florida case, the law enforcement officers requested
assistance from the photographer.24 9 A New York county court dismissed
a Fletcher-style implied consent defense in Anderson v. WROC-TV,2 ° a
trespass case against the employers of several television news people who
accompanied a humane society investigator on a home search at his
invitation. The judge granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
declaring the defense a result of "self-created custom and practice" and a
"bootstrap argument which does not eliminate the trespassory conduct of
the defendants .... It is hornbook law that consent as a defense to an
action in trespass must be given by the owner or possessor of the
premises."2 1
2. The First Amendment Privilege to Gather News
It is also "hornbook law" that media operating in the latter half of the
twentieth century have enjoyed broad freedom to report and publish
information with impunity, or nearly so, thanks to the enormous body of
First Amendment jurisprudence handed down by the United States Supreme
Court.21 2 Interestingly enough, the Court, however, has never created a
constitutionally protected right of access for news media to the scenes of
news events in general. In Branzburg v. Hayes,21 3 the Court stated that
"[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime
or disaster when the general public is excluded . ..24 Yet, the Court
has recognized the right of news media to attend criminal trials, 215 and
has approved of newsgathering where it was done lawfully.
216
Lower courts have refused to grant the press immunity from tort
liability arising from newsgathering conduct.217  In Dietemann v. Time,
209. Id. at 773.
210. 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
211. Id. at 223 (citing 61 N.Y. JUR. TRESPASS §3 1).
212. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966).
213. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
214. Id. at 684.
215. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 557 (1980).
216. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
217. See Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Anderson v. WROC, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("News
people have no special First Amendment immunity or special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others."). Id. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Crimes and
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Inc.,28 an opinion widely regarded as authoritative in the area of
intrusion liability in newsgathering, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit examined the newsgathering practices of investigative
reporters in light of the First Amendment:
Investigative reporting is an ancient art; its successful practice
long antecedes the invention of miniature cameras and electronic
devices. The First Amendment has never been construed to
accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed
during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is
not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic
means into the precincts of another's home or office." 9
3. Safer Grounds for Media Defendants
While neither the Fletcher-style implied consent defense nor the First
Amendment show much promise in immunizing sidekick journalists from
liability for trespass and/or intrusion when they enter private property
without proper authorization, a glance through past newsgathering entry
cases provides some clear indication of what is required to escape liability.
There is no liability, for example, where the media defendant did not
participate in the physical invasion.220 Similarly, there is no liability for
trespass where the media defendant obtained information while situated on
public property.22' Entry by the media on private property is lawful
where consent is given by the owner or rightful possessor,22 even when
torts committed in news gathering are not protected. There is no threat to a free press in
requiring its agents to act within the law."). Id.
218. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
219. Id. at 249.
220. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969);
Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiff
cannot recover under the intrusion theory since the defendant did not commit a "positive act" of
encroachment).
221. See Wehling v. CBS, Inc., 721 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983); Dempsey v. National
Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927 (D. Me. 1988); Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd in relevant part, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987);
Colorado v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1993); Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328
S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); Stessman v. American Black
Hawk Broadcasting, 416 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa 1987); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Berosini, 867 P.2d 1121 (Nev. 1994); Bishee v. Conover, 452 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1982); Le
Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Mark v. King Broadcasting Co.,
618 P.2d 512 (Wash. 1980), af'd, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
222. See Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lal v. CBS, 551 F. Supp.
356 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afftd, 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984).
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such consent was fraudulently induced.223 And in a recent case, the court
found no liability for intrusion where no harm resulted from it.
224
VII. HOME IS NO PLACE FOR "LAW
ENFORCEMENT THEATRICALS"
To appreciate the privacy and property concerns raised by sidekick
journalism, one need only recall what has become a familiar television
scenario depicting people caught off-guard in their homes. They are often
in various stages of undress, sometimes cowering in comers or closets, and
invariably shielding their faces from the glare of camera lights as they are
handcuffed and led away by police. The property and privacy rights of
such individuals do not vanish the moment they become subjects of a
warrant. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment requires that such rights not be
obliterated during searches and seizures, but preserved to the maximum
extent consistent with the public's interest in community safety and crime
control. What makes televised home searches unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment is not only that they fail to satisfy this requirement, but
also that they involve police authorization of unlawful conduct by third
parties.
The press has a First Amendment right of access not only to criminal
trials 225 but also, under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,226 to
preliminary proceedings in criminal cases. Such proceedings are open to
the press, provided there has been a tradition of public access to them and
that public access plays an essential role in the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system.27  This right of access does not necessarily
extend back in time to the point of arrest, however, particularly when the
arrest takes place inside a private residence. There is no tradition of public
access to the interior of a private dwelling and no essential role played by
such access in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system that
would justify press invasion of a private home.
One might be tempted to view police/media invasions of private
property as serving the same kinds of constitutional interests that United
States Supreme Court Justice Burger cited in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
223. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
224. See Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
225. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
226. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
227. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at
582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) and 584-98 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
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v. Virginia228 to justify public and media access to the processes of the
criminal justice system. Chief Justice Burger states that media access to
the processes of the criminal justice system is warranted by the media's
role as a surrogate for the public and that such access to the behind-the-
scene activities of the system promotes free discussion of governmental
affairs by giving the public a greater understanding of the system and how
it works.229 But, media access to private property during search warrant
executions could come at the expense of the government's effectiveness.
The unauthorized presence of cameras could result in the suppression of
evidence and thus compromise the efforts of law enforcement to function
effectively. The result would be to confound, rather than to enhance, the
public's understanding of the criminal justice system.
Chief Justice Burger also states that access ensures fairness in the
government's conduct. 23 ° When the press acts as the public's surrogate,
such fairness presupposes press objectivity; however, close collaboration
between media and law enforcement may compromise press objectivity.
Since videotaping of law enforcement activity may be prearranged, and law
enforcement personnel may retain editorial control over the scenes
ultimately broadcast, candor in the government conduct depicted may
become a serious issue.
The Court further states that access permits public scrutiny of
government conduct, thereby guarding against corruption and encouraging
government actors to perform their roles more responsibly.231  As
previously noted, however, in the context of sidekick journalism, the
effectiveness of the media in scrutinizing the conduct of law enforcement
personnel may be greatly compromised given the potentially collusive and
non-spontaneous nature of the joint enterprise.
Response from the media to the Ayeni decision has been critical, as
evidenced by one comment that "[j]udges have no business impounding
videotapes and telling people how to cover stories . . 232 When
reporters cover stories in a manner asserted to be unlawful, prompting civil
lawsuits, however, the courts necessarily become involved. When the
release of videotapes is essential to a defendant's ability to obtain a fair
trial, the First Amendment protection afforded the press must yield.
228. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
229. Id. at 571-73, 577 n.12.
230. Id. at 569-70.
231. Id. at 569.
232. Jane Hall, Ruling May Affect Taping of Searches, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, at FI 1
(quoting David Bartlett, Director of the Radio and Television News Directors Association).
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At least one media representative has expressed the opinion that a
signed release from the suspects captured on camera serves as protection
against a lawsuit by them.233 As noted earlier, however, consent must be
freely given.23 To be effective, it must be given voluntarily;235 it
cannot be obtained through coercion.23 6  In the words of Henry
Rossbacher, plaintiffs' attorney in Ayeni v. Mottola, "After you've thrown
the guy on the floor ... [a signed release is] not only morally reprehen-
sible, but legally insignificant .... In these circumstances, any consent is
coerced and is void legally.,
237
Finally, police/media invasions raise ethical concerns. Too much
collaboration of this sort raises issues of press objectivity and self interest
on the part of government officials.238 Rossbacher explains the concern
this way:
The serving of a search warrant is not a supermarket
opening, but, with the new "reality" shows, you have all kinds
of government agencies taking TV news crews along. What
business does CBS have making deals with Secret Service
agents for coverage? This relationship demeans both law
enforcement and journalism.
239
VIII. CONCLUSION
To the extent that it invades private homes, the joint enterprise
between media and police in producing news and reality-based entertain-
ment programs is in trouble with the law. Law enforcement agencies that
have not already done so would be well advised to heed the recent FBI
warning to cease practices that involve taking media onto private property
without the consent of the property owner or possessor. Media or-
233. Hall, supra note 232, at F I I ("John Langley, co-executive producer of the Fox series
'Cops,' said that he did not believe his show would be affected by the [Ayeni v. CBS Inc.] ruling.
'We don't claim to be journalists operating under the aegis of the news-we're considered
entertainment,' Langley said. 'We are there by invitation of the participating law-enforcement
agencies, and we don't disclose someone's identity without their permission."'). Id.
234. See supra note 187.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Neumeister, supra note 148, at A18 (quoting Henry Rossbacher, attorney for plaintiffs
in Ayeni v. Mottola).
238. See Jon Katz, Covering the Cops: A TV Show Moves in Where Journalists Fear to
Tread, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 25; Lew Irwin, Cops and Cameras; Why
TV Is Slow to Cover Police Brutality, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 15.
239. Hall, supra note 232, at F 11 (quoting Henry Rossbacher, attorney for plaintiffs in Ayeni
v. Mottola).
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ganizations should be aware that First Amendment and implied consent
arguments are largely ineffective in defeating trespass and intrusion claims.
Aside from the legal risks, the practice risks tarnishing the integrity of both
law enforcement and journalism and, in so doing, diminishes their value to
society. The time has come for police/reporter teams to exercise restraint
when making house calls, recognizing that "[a] private home is not a
soundstage for law enforcement theatricals. '24 °
240. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
